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Parties to Offences

A number of people may be involved in the commission of an offence, but the degree of their involvement may vary a good deal, and the law has to decide what degree will suffice for criminal responsibility. The commission of the offence may be instigated by A, assisted by B, the actual commission effected by C and D may take steps to enable all the parties to the offence to escape detection and prosecution. In Nigerian, under the criminal code, A, B, and C, are referred to as principal offenders while D is referred to as necessary after the fact. So in essence, there are two distinct classes of parties;

  • Principal offencer; and
  • Necessaries after the fact

This is in contrast with English law where a distinction is drawn between principal in the first degree and principal in the second degree. Principal in the first degree is the person who actually commits the offence while principal in the second degree is the person who aids, abets counsel or procures the commission of offence. The provision of section 7 of the criminal code sets out the mode of participation in a crime that constitutes the basis of liability as a principal offender. It provides that when an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it

  1. Every person who actually does the act or makes the omission which constitutes the offence;
  2. Every person who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling another person to commit the offence;
  3. Every person who aids another person in committing the offence; or
  4. Any person who advices, counsels or procures any other person to commit the offence.

Any participation in the commission of an offence within the provisions of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) make the party a principal offender and such party may be charged with actually committing the offence.

Liability as a principal offender

Section 7 (a) provides that:

Every person who actually does thee act or makes the omission which constitutes the offence.

Little discussion of this category is necessary. The man who sticks the knife in is the man who does the murder. And if, as in Julius Caesar, a number of people stick a knife in and it is possible to say that each blow caused death, then all are said to have done the act constituting the offence.

There is no reference in section 7 to the mental element required to render the party liable as principal offender. In R V. Solomon, the Queensland court of criminal appeal held that section 7 should be read in conjunction with section 24 and section 7 is not intended to create responsibility for unwilled acts arising out of a plan or concert. The implication of this holding is that before a person is liable under section 7 (a) he must have done the act or make the omission with the requisite mental element required by law for the offence.

In fact stopped for a moment, he was convicted of manslaughter of a passenger who died in the collision because his conduct showed gross negligence and a complete disregard for the lives and safety of his passengers.